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To satisfy this test, petitioners need not show that
Congress recited any specific "magic words".
See the
dissenting opinion of the CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 2 and
note 2.
Instead, our inquiry at this step in the analysis
is whether Congress has indicated that it intends the
statutory remedy to replace, rather than to complement, the
Bivens remedy. Where Congress decides to enact a statutory
remedy which it views as fully adequate only in combination
with the Bivens remedy, e.g. 28 u.s.c. § 2680(h), that
congressional decision should be given effect by the
courts.
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Subsequent footnotes will be renumbered accordingly.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
APR 1 e 1980
Recirculated: ___________
No. 78-1261
Norman A, Carlson, Director,
Federal Bureau of Prisons,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
et al., Petitioners,
United States Court of
v.
Appeals for the Seventh
~arie Green, Administratrix
Circuit.
of the Estate of Joseph
Jones, Jr.
[March -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART '
joins, collcurring in the judgment.
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states the
principles governing Bivens actions as follows:
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutionai
violation . . . have a right to recover damages. . . . Such
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations.
The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
by Congress.' . . • The second is when defendants
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective. . . ." Ante, at S:-4 (emphasis in original).
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond
the prior holdings of this Court.

I
We are concerned here with inferring a right of action for
damages directly from the Constitution. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 242 (1979), the Court said that persons
who have "no l other] effective means of redress" "must be
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able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." The
Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "principled discretion" that must be brought to bear when a court is asked to
infer a private cause of action not specified by the enacting
authority. Jd., at 252 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But the
Court's opinion, read literally, would restrict that discretion
dramatically. Today we are told that a ~<?urt must entertain
a Bivens suit unless the action is "defeated" in one of ~wo
specified ways.
Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be unnecessary when Congress has provided "equally effective" alternative remedies. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971); see Davis v. Passman, supra, 442
U. S., at 248. The Court now volunteers the view that a defendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The defendant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective." Ante, at
4 (emphasis in original). These are unnecessarily rigid conditions. The Court cites no authority and advances no policy
reason-indeed no reason at all-for imposing this threshold
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case.
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies
that would be exclusive. Yet, today's opinion apparently will
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic
garb. No purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice of
remedies in these circumstances. Nor is there any precedent
for requiring federal courts to blind themselves to congressional intent expressed in language other than that whid1 we
prescribe.
A defendant also may defeat the Bivens remedy under
today's decision if "special factors" counsel "hesitation." But
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the Court provides no further guidance on this point. The
opinion states simply that no such factors are present in this
case. The Court sa.ys that petitioners enjoy no "independent
status in our constitutional scheme" that would make judicially created remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 4. But the
implication that official status may be a "special factor" is withdrawn in the sentence that foilows, which conciudes that
qualified immunity affords all the protection necessary to
ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other
factors relevant to the purported exception are mentioned.
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area
will hereafter be confined to the question of alternative remedies, which is in turn reduced to the single determination that
congressional action does or does not comport with the specifications prescribed by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's longstanding recognition that Congress is ultimately the appropriate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5;
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essentially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan
once said, a court should "take into account [a range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express statutory
authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supra, at
407. The Court does not explain why this discretion should
be limited in the manner announced today.
The Court's absolute language is all the more puzzling
because it comes in a case where the implied remedy is plainly
appropriate under any measure of discretion. The Federal
Tort Claims Act, on which petitioners relv, simply is not an
adequate remedy. 1 And there a.re reasonably clear indications
1

l)qt

The Federal Tort Claims Act is not a federal remedial scheme at all,
{t wnivrr of sovereign immunity that permits an injured claimant to.
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that Congress did not intend that statute to displace Biven8
claims. See ante, at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has
been identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore agree
that a private damages remedy properly is inferred from the
Constitution in this case. But I do not agree that Bivens
plaintiffs have a "right" to such a remedy whenever the
defendant fails to show that Congress has "provided an
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it explicitly
declared to be a substitute . ... " In my view, the Court's
willingness to infer federal causes of action that cannot be
found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a
rational system of justice. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-749 (1979) (PowELL, J., dissenting). 2

II
In Part HI of its opinion, the Court holds that 11 'whenever
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in
death, the federal common law a1lows survival of the action. '"
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I
recover damages against the United States where a private person "would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S. C. § 1346 (b); see also 28 U.S. C.
§ 2674. Here, as in Bivens itself, a plaintiff denied l1is constitutional
remedy wuuld be remitted to the vagaries of state law. See 403 U. S., at
394-395. Thr FTCA gives the plaintiff even less t11an l1e would receive
under state law in many rase. , because the :statute is hedged with protections for the United State>J. A~ the Court points out, the FTCA allows
neither jury trial nor punitive damages. Ante, at 7. And recovery may
be barrPd altogether if the claim arises from a "discretionary function" or
"the execution of a statute or regulat.ion, whether or not such statute or
regulation is valid." 28 U.S. C.§ 2680 (a) .
2 I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer
causes of action from statutrs as from t.h e Con~titution. See Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-242 (1979). I do believe, however, that tl1e
Court today has over~tepped the bounds of rational judicial decisionmaking in both contexts.

--·-:''
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agree that the relevant policies require the application of
federal common law to allow survival in this case.
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national remedial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal common law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not
covered by the "laws of the United States."
The Court's opinion in this case does stop short of mandating uniform rules to govern aU aspects of Bivens actions.
Ante, at 9-10, n. 10. But the Court also says that the preference for state law embodied in § 1988 is irrelevant to the
selection of rules that will govern actions against federal officers under Bivens. Ibid. I see no basis for this view. In
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 498-504, and n. 25 (1978),
the Court thought it unseemly that different rules should
govern the liability of federal and state officers for similar
constitutional wrongs. I would not disturb that understanding today.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'rm
No. 78-1261
Norman A. Carlson, Director,
FPderal Bureau of Prisons,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
et al., Petitioners,
United States Court of
v.
Appeals for the Seventh
Marie Gre("ll, Administratrix
Circuit.
of the Estate of Joseph
Jones, Jr.
[March -, 1980]
MR. Jus'rlCI•; BHENNAN delivered the opiuion of the Court.
Respondent brought this suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of 'Indiana on behalf of the estate of her
deceased SOil , Joseph Jones, Jr. , alleging that he suffered
personal iuj uries from which he died because the petitioners,
federal prison officials, violated his due process, equal pr~
tection , and Eighth Amendment rights. 1 Asserting jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) , she claimed compensatory
and punitive damages for the constitutional violations. Two
1 More ;;pecifieally, re.,].xmdent allrgru that petitioners, being fully ap~
pri;;ed of t hr gro~,; inadequacy of medical fa.cilitie:s and staff at 1he Federal
Correc1ion Center in Terre Haute, Indiana, and of the ::.eriousne:os of
Jones' chronie a~thmatie condition, nonethele:<:; kept him in that facility
agninst the advire of doctor,;, failed to give him competent medical •tttention for :;ome eight hour,; after he had tUl a.,;thmatie attack, administered eoutm-iuiliea,ted drug:> which ma,dc hi;; at.tnck more ~evcrc, attempted
to use a respirator known to be inoperative which further imprdecl his
breathing. and dPla.,·ecl for too long a time his tmusfer to an outside
ho:spital. The complaint further allege:; tlmt June,;' death resulted from
these acts and omi~sions, that petitioner;; were dclibrra.tcly indifferent to
Jane,;' seriou10 medical need:;, and tha.t their indifference was in part
attributable to racial prejudice.

~ I

..
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questions are presented for decision: ( 1) Is a remedy available directly under the Constitution given that respondent's
allegations could also support ~ suit against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act? 2 and (2) If so, is survival
of the cause of action governed by federal conunon law or by
state statutes?

I
The District Court held that under Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U. S. 97 (1976). the allegations set out in note 1, supra,
pleaded a violatio11 of the Eighth Amendment's proscription
againsL i11f1iction of cruel and unusual punishment a giving
rise to a cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U. S. 388 (1971). The court recognized that the decedent
could have maintained this action if he had survived, but dismissed the complaint because in its view the damages remedy
as a matter of federal law was limited to that provided by
Indiana's survivorship and wro11gful death laws and. as the
court construed those laws, the damages available to Jones'
estate failed to meet § 1331 (a)'s $10,000 jurisdictional
amount requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit agrcPCl that an Eighth Amendment violation was
pleaded umler Estelle and that a cause of action was stated
2 This qur~f ion was pre:<t>ntecl in the petition for crrtiomri, but not in
<'iilwr the: Di~trir1 . Court. or thr Comt of Appeals. However, rrspondent
doe>; nof; ohj<'('f, fo it~ drei~ion b~· this Court. Though Wf' do not normally
clPc·ide i~:suc>s nof ]H'P:SPnted below, we arr not }Jrecluded from doiug :,:o. E. g.,
Youakim v. Miller. 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976). Here, the i~;;ue i:s squarely
presentt'd :wd fully briefed. It i;; an important, recurring is:sn(' and is
propPrly rai~Pd in :UJothrr pc>tition for certiorari being held pending disposition of thi~ ca~r. See Loe v. Armistead, 582 F. 2d 1291 (CA4 Hl78),
cert. pending sub nom. Moffit v. Loe, No. 78-1260. We conclude that
the intrrP:;t.~ or j11flirial administration will be ~ervcd Ly addre;;:;ing the
issnc on its merit~.
3 Petitioners do no(, contest 1he determination that the allegations ~;atisfy
the standard::> ~et out in E~telte.

78-12tll-OPINION
CAHLSON v. GREEN

3

under Bivens, but reversed the holding that § 1331 (a)'s jurisdictional amount requirement was not met.'1 Rather, the
Court of Appeals held that ~ 1331 (a) was satisfied because
"whenever the relevant State survival statute would abate a
Bive11s- type action brought against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common law allows survival
of thr action." 581 F. 2d 669, 675 (1978). The court reasoned that the Indiana law, if applied, would "subvert" "the
policy of allowing complete vindication of constitutional
rights'' by making it "more advantageous for a tortfeasor to
kill rather than to injure." !d., at 674. We granted cer.
tior·ari. 442 U.S.- (1979). We affirm.

II
Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a fedt>ral ageut ~av~ a right to recover damages
against the official in federal court despite the absence of
any statute co11ferring such a right. Such a cause of action
may be drf<'atcd in a particular ease, however, in ~ situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate "special fac4 The rt>lPvaut Jndi:uw Iii\\' prm·ide;; thaL a per~onal injury claim does
not ~\uTi\'(• whprc• th<· act>< t·omplain('([ of muse<l thr victim';; death. Incl.
Code § :~-t-1-1 - 1. lndi:mt <loc:; provide a wrongful drath rau,;e of action
for tiH• prr~onal rrprp~rntati\·e of onr who;;p death i:; cau,;ed by an alleged
wrongful art. or omi~<"'ion. Damage~ may "inrlud!P], but· Lare] not
limited to, n•n,:omihlc mrdi<'al, hoKpit a.!, func•ral nnd hurial expensrs, and
lo:<t earning~<." But. if fhe c!P.cC'clent, is not ~urvivcd by a ~pOUR{', dept•ndent
child, or dl'pendent next of kin. then t.hr recon>ry i~ limited to expenses
incurrpd iu eounPC'tion with the death. Ind . Code § :34-1-1-2.
Th!1 Di;;trict Conr1 read the complaint in thi~ ral'r a.-: ~tMing rlaim:;
undrr both §§ !34-1-1-1 and :~4-1-1-2. Acrordingl~r. thr conrt a&>umed
that. reC'on•ry 011 tho cl:1im \\':1>< limited t.o expen~r~ (all of whieh would be
pa.id by tho Fedrral Gon•r1m1ent) onl~' becaw;e .lone,; died without a spon~c
or :my dqwncl<·nt:-:. Thr Court of App!1a1~< n•nd the complaint a;; "tnting
onlr a ,-urvi\'Or,<hip rlaim on behnlf of Jon<'" tmclrr § 34--1-1-1. Thus it.
ai:>SurnPfl that the clnim would ha.ve abatrd C'vcn if Jone:s had ]pft, depend\•nt,; or :\ ,.:pou~e. 581 F . 2<1 (i()9, l\72, n. 4. H.e:'olution of t.Ius cona
:(lict ifi irrelrvnn1 in ligh1 of our holding to<hy.
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tors counselling hesitati011 in the absence of affirmative action
by Congress." !d., 403 U. S., at 396; Davis v. Passman,
442 U. S. 228, 245 (1979). The second is when defendants
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which
it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly
under tho Constitution and viewed as equally effective.
Bivens, 403 U. S., at 397; Davis v. Passma:n, 442 U. S., at
245-247.
Neither situation obtaius in this case. First, the case. involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative actio11 by Cougress. PetiLioners do llOt enjoy
such independent status iu our constitutional scheme as to
suggest that judicially created remedies against them might
be inappropriate. Davis v. Passman. 442 U. S., at 246.
Moreover, ewn if requiring them to defend respondent's suit
might inhibit their efforts to perform their official duties,
the qualified immunity accorded them under Butz v. Economou, 438 U. H. 478 (1978), provides adequate protection.
See Davis v. Passma:n, 442 U. S., at 246.
Second, we have here no explicit congressional declaration
that perso11S injured by - federal oiti"cers' violations of the
Eighth Amendnwnt may not recover money damages from
the agents but must be remitted to another remedy, equally
effE>cti vc in the view of Congress. Petitioners point to nothing
in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) or its legislative history to show that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens
remedy or to create an equally efi'ecti ve remedy for constitutional violations. FTCA was enacted long before Bivens
was decided, but whe11 Congress amended FTCA in 1974 to
create a cause of action against the United States for intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers, 28
U. S. C. ~ 2680 (h), the congressional comments accompanying
that amendment made it crystal clear that Congress views
FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action:
(' [AJ fter the date of euactmettt of this measure, innocent

l?w
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individuals who are subjected to raids [like that in
Bivens] will have a cause of action agaiust the individual
Federal agents and the Federal Government. Furthermore, this provision should be viewed as a counterpart
to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it waives
the defense of sovereign immu11ity so as to make the
Govermuent independently liable in damages for the same
type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens
(and for which that case imposes liability upon the individual Government officials involved." S. Rep. No.
93-588, ~l3d Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1973) (emphasis
supplied).
In the absener of a contrary expression from Congress, ~ 2680
(h) thus contemplates that victims of the kind of intentional
wrongdoing alleged in this complaint shall have an action
under }i'TCA agaiust the United Btates as well as a Bivens
action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed
their co 11 stit u tiona] rights.
This COIJclusion is buttressed by the significant fact that
Cougress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it
means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy. See 38 U. S. C.
§ 4116 (a). 42 r. S. C. ~ 233 (a). 42 U. S. C. ~ 2458a, 10
U. S. C. ~ 1089 (a). and 22 U. S. C. § 817 (a) (malpractice
by certain Government health personnel); 28 U. S. C. ~ 2679
(b) (operation of motor vehicles by federal employees); and
42 U. S. C. ~ 247b (k) (manufacturers of swine flu vaccine).
Furthermore, Congress has not taken action on other bills that
would expand the exclusivity of FTCA. See, e. g., S. 695,
96th Cong .. 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (HJ79); S. 3314, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
Four additional factors, each suggesting that the Bivens
remedy is more effective than the FTCA remedy, also support
our conclusiou that Congress did not intend to limit respondent to an FTC A action. First. the Bivens remedy, in addition
to compeusating victims, serves a deterrent purpose. See:
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Butz v. Bconomou, 438 U. S. 478, 505 (1978). 5 Because the
Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more
effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United
States. 1t is almost axiomatic that the threat of damages
has a deterrent effect, 6 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409,
442 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurrillg in the judgment), surely
particularly so when the individual official faces personal
financial liability.
Petitioners argue that FTCA liability is a more effective
deterrent because the individual employees responsible for the
Govermnen t's liability would risk loss of employment 7 and
becaus<'S the Government would be forced to promulgate
corrective policies. That argument suggests, however, that
the supPriors would not take thC' same actions when an employee is found persoually liable for violation of a citizen's
constitutional rights. The more reasonable assumption is that
responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for
the public fisc but also by concern for the Government's
integrity.
Second, our decisions, although not expressly addressing
and deciding tlw qtH'stion, indicate that p~nay
be awarded iu a Bivens suit. Punitive damages are "a partier. ..J-2 11 . S. C. § ](.),'{:{ ~<'rve,; ~imilar purpose:>. Ser, e. g., Robertson v.
Wegma1111 . ..J.:~H 1'. ::l . .5~4, 590-591 (1978) ; Carey v. Piphus. 485 U.S. 247,
256 (Hl7~) ; J!itl'hum " · Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) ; Monroe v.
Pape, :lG5 U.S. lo7, li:Z-187 (1961).

t~ Indrrd, nnd<'rlying the qualifird immunity which public officials enjoy
for action~ taken in good faith i~:> thr fear that expo::;ure to pcr::;onalliability
would otherwiRr d<·ter them from acting at all. See Butz v. Economou,
438 U. 8. 47~, 497 (1978) ; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
7
Some doubt. ha~ been east on the validity of the as~umption that there
exi"t. adt?quate mrl'hani~ms for rli"riplining federal Pmployt?es in such cases.
See T<•,;timOH) of Griitin B. BPI!, Attornt?y General of the United St<ttes,
.Joint. HPariup; bcfon· thl' SubeommittPe 011 Citiz~·n~ and Shareholders
Right;; and Benwdie,.. and tlw Subcommittee on Admini~:> trative Practice
aml Procedure of the Sl'nate Committee on the Judiciary, Part 1, 95th
Cong., 2d Se.~~ . , at 6 (1978).

?
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ular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal
courts," Bivens, 403 U. S., at 397, and are especially appropriate to redress the violation by a government official of a
citizen's constitutional rights. Moreover, punitive damages
are available in "a proper" § 1983 action, Carey v. Piphus,
435 U. S. 247. 257, n. 11 (1978) (punitive damages not
awarded beca,use District Court found defendants "did not act
with a malicious intenti011 to deprive respondents of their
rights or to do them some other injury"), 8 and Butz v. Econornu, supra, suggests that the "constitutional design" would
be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the
same liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional
transgression. 438 TT. R.. at 504. But punitive damages in an
FTCA suit are sta,tutorily prohibited. 28 U. S. C. § 2674.
Thus FTCA is that much less effective than a Bivens action
as a deterrent to unconstitutional acts.
Third, a plaiutiff cannot opt for a jury in an FTCA action,
28 U. S. C. § 2402, as he may in a Bivens suit.u Petitioners
argue that this is an irrelevant difference because juries have
bee11 biased against Bive·11s claimants. Reply Brief at 7,
Brief at 30-31, u. 30. Significantly, however. they do not
assert that judges tryiug the claims as FTCA actions would
have been more receptive, and they caunot explain why the
plain tiff should not retaiu the choice.
Moreover, af1rr Carey punitive tlamag<•::; may be the oul~· significant
availahle in some § 198:~ action;;: wheN· eon~titutional rights are
ma.liriou,.;l~· violated but the victim eannot. prove comtwn:se~ble injury.
u Petitiom•rs argur t.hat. thP availability of punitive damages or a jury
trial under Biven~ i:; irrclrvanl brcau:sc nPither i:s a necessary elpmcnt of a
rem{'(lial ~ehemr. But that argumrnt completPl)· mi:;,;C's the mark. The
iS::~ue iH not. whrt brr a. Biven.s cause of action or nny one of it::; particular
features i::; e::N•ntial. Hath<·r the in4uir~· i,.; whether CongrP>'!< ha,; rrerttrd
whnt it. view::; as an equally elfedive rem(ldial ~rlwme. Otherwi::;e the two
can rxi~t Hide by ~ide. Mon·owr, no ouc dilferencl' need independently
rendPr FTCA inadequnte. l t. can fail to Lw equally effective on lhe
cumulative baO>is of more than 011e difference.
8

remed~ ·
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Fourtl1. an action under FTCA exists only if the State in
.,.,·hich the allrgf'cl misconduct occurred would permit a cause
of action for that misconduct to go fonvard. 28 U. S. C.
§ 1346 (h) (Filit<.'cl States liable "in accordance with the law
of the place wiH•re the act or omission occurred."). Yet it is
obvious that thf' liability of federal officials for violations
of citi7.f'ns' constitutional rights should be· governed by uniform rulf':::.. ..'cc Part III. infra. The question whether respondent's action for violations by federal officials of federal
constitutional rights should be left to the vagaries of the laws
of the S(•wral Rtatrs admits of only a negative answer iu the
absence ol' a eo11trary congressional resolution.
Plainly FTC'.\ is not a. sufficirnt wotector of the citizens'
constitutic>llal rights. and \Vithout a clear congressional malldate m• cannot hold that Congress relC'gated respondent exclusively to tlw FTC'A remedy.

J

~~
I'

III
Bivens actionR are a creation of ff'dera] Jaw a11d, therefore,
t.ho qm•stion whether rC'spondcnt's action survivc:>d Jones'
death i:-; a qu<>stion of fedrral law. See Burks Y. Lasker, 441
~
U. R. 471, 47(:) ( HJ79). Petitioners. howc:>ver, would have us
fashion a fr<kra1 rule of survivorship that incorporates the
survivorship laws of the forum State, at least where the state
law is not inconsistent with federal law. Respondent argues,
on the other hand. that only f\mifonn federal rule of survivorship is compati e w1th t e goal o deterring federal
offieials from infringing federal constitutional rights in tho
manner alleg<'d in respondent's cotuplaint. We agree with respondent. Whatever difficulty we might have resolving the
question were the federal involvement less clear, we hold that
only a uniform federal rule of survivorship wilTSi:lmce to
rerucs. · the cuustituti onaT Ciepri vation he;; alleged and to
protect agaiust rPpetition of such conduct.

I
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Iu short, we agree with and ado~~ the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals, 581 F. 21, at 674-6 5 (footnote omitted):
~ality of the survival of civil rights claims
for complete villdication of constitutional rights is buttressed by the need for uniform treatment of those claims,
at least where they are against federal officials. As this
very case illustrates, uniformity cannot be achieved if
courts arc limited to applicable state law. Here the roleva11t Itldiaml statute would not permit survival of the
claint, \vhilt> in Beard [v. Robinson, 563 F. 2d 331 (CA7
1977) .J th(' Illinois statute permitted survival of the
Bivens aetion. The liability of federal agents for violation of eonstitutional rights should not depend upon
where the violatiou occurred . . . . -. In sum, we hold
that whenever the rclPvant state survival statute would
abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants
whose conduct results in death, the federal common law
allows survival of the action."

~

~

I

Robertson \". Wegmann, S'upra, holding that a § 1983 action

would abate iu accordance with Louisiana survivorship law
is not to the contrary. There the plaintiff's death was not
caused by thp acts of the defendants upon which the suit was
bascd. 10 Moreover, Robertson QXpresslsy recognized that to

u. s. c.

10 Robert~Oil r~~-<hionC'd it.-< holdiug U~' rPferencc to 42
§ 1988
which reqnircti tlmt ~ 191':3 aetion,; be govt>rned L.v
"the comou la"·, a~< moditiPd and chnnged b~· the con::;titu1ion :md lmvs of
tho S1ak whcrrin the court, having juritidirt.ion of !tho] civil ... c~msc
is held, :<o J:tr as the ~;amo i~< noL incon~istent wiLh the Constitution rUld
laws of tlH' !Jnitcd St.~tes."
Section 108K doel'l not i11 (.crm~ apply Lo !Jivens aelions, and there are
cogent n•aHOJJ~ not to appl~· iL to till<'h action:;; even by an;tlogy. Bivens
def('nclant.s a ro fedrral officiab brought. into federal court for viohtting
the Fetlt>ral Constitution . No stalr intpre"'ts arr implicnted by appl~·ing
pur<'ly federal Jaw to t lwm. Whil<' it rna kes some sense to aU ow asp<'cts
of § 198:~ litigation to var.'· neconliug to the laws of the StatPs under
whotie authority § 1!)83 rldcmlants work, federal officials have no l'limilar

I
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prevent frustration of the detcrre11ce goals of § 1983 (which in
part also u11derlie Bivens actions, see Part II, supra) "[a]
state official ·contemplating illegal activity must always be
prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed
against him." 436 U. S., at 592. A federal official contem- ~
plating unconstitutional conduct similarly must be prepared
to face the prospect of a Bivens action. A m1ifonn rule that
claims such as respondent's survive the decedent's death is
essential if we are not to "frustrate in [an] important way
the achievement" of the goals of Bivens actions. Auto
Work ers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 702-703
(19uG). 11
Affirmed.

claim to be bound only by t.he law of the State in which they happen to
work. Bivens, 403 U. S., at. 409 (~arlan, J., concurring). Moreover,
the><e petitionNs lt<LW l he power to tram;fer pri::;ouer;:; to facilitie:; in any
ono of Rcvend Stat p,.; whirh may lmvo different rulrs governing :;urvivorship or othrr ns])('rt,.; of the ra~e, tlwreby controlling to Home extent the
law that would apply to t,hPir ow11 wronguoing. See Robertson, 436
U. S., at 592-5!J:3, antl n. 10. Another m;pect of tho power to transfer
pri:;oncrs freely within tho federal pri~on sy:slcm is that tlwre is no reason
to expect thnt auy givcu pri;;oner will have any ties to the State in which
he is incarremted, and, therefore, the Stnle will have litt.le intere::,t in
having iti-1 law applied to tlmt. pri;;oner. Neverthc]e;;:-;, a:; to other ;;ur- ~
vivorship questiou~ tlw,t may arise in Bivens actions, it may be thi~t the
federal law Hhould choo~c to incorporate !>tate rule:;; a~ a matter of convenience. Wo leave such que::~tiom; for another day.
11 Othcrwi~e, UJt offirial could know a,t, the t.imc he dE'cicled to act
whether hi::; intrndecl virtim',- rlaim would survive. Cf. Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cnrdinal Corp., 315:3 U. S. 696 (100{)) (whether ;;tntute of limita,.
tion will matter cannot be known at time of conduct),

1
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM: Ellen
RE:

No. 78-1261, Carlson v. Green

I

Mr. Justice Brennan's draft opinion for the Court bothers
me for four reasons.

(1) First, his discussion of the Bivens cause

of action incorporates the same analysis you objected to in
Passman.

On p. 3-4, the governing principles are set out as

follows:
/X

e~tabli

~Jl ,

4/ ~ -'-1 •

~~

ivens
ed that the victims of
const1tut1onal iolation . • . have a r'gh
o
recover damage • • . . Such a cause o
tion may be
defeated .
in two situations :
i) . hen
defendants
onstrate "special factors ounselling
hesitation
the absence of affirmative action by
ongress [,
( i i)] when defendants show that
Congress has rovided an alternative remedy which it
explicitly d clared ·to be a substitute for recovery
directly und _r the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective." (first emphasis added, second in
original).

Again, the Court ignores the rule that "federal courts must
exercise a principled discretion when called upon to infer a
private cause of action directly from the language fo the
Constitution."

(From your Passman dissent, p. 1).

This case

differs from Passman in that there is nothing that should lead the
Court to reject the damages action.

But I do not know that you

want to join an opinion that so explicitly and affirmatively adopts
the "right to damages" idea.

JA...,

2.

(2)

Second, Mr. Justice Brennan writes that alternative

remedies will not be deemed to replace Bivens actions unless
Congress "explicitly declare[s it] to be a substitute.
4)

(emphasis in original).

II

I doubt that this is true.

( p.

Moreover,

it is wholly irrelevant in this case, where Congress plainly didn't
intend to replace Bivens actions.

This congressional intent, like

an explicit declaration, is relevant.

But neither expressed intent

nor the lack of it should be controlling.
(3)

--

Third, and less significant, the opinion omits what

I consider to be the most crucial reasons why the FTCA
not adequate.
~

emedy is

Mr. Justice Brennan mentions that "an action under

FTCA exists only if the State . . . would permit a cause of action
for that misconduct to go foraward."

But he then says only that

"it is obvious that the liability of federal officials . . • should
be governed by uniform rules."

That proposition - at least as

broadly stated as it is in this opinion -

is not obvious to me.

The important point about the FTCA's reliance on state law is that
i~ the FTCA is not a

federal remedial scheme -

~ sovereign immunity for existing tort claims.

it merely waives
Nothing guarantees

that the state law tort will bear any resemblance to the
constitutional one, or that it will effectuate the policies
underlying Bivens.

That - not lack of uniformity -

deficiency of the FTCA remedy.
no mention of the

is the

Moreover, Mr. Justice Brennan makes

..._______

exceptions to the FTCA (Bench Memo, at 3-

4) which could reduce the availability of the remedy even below
what exists under state law.

3.

(4)

Fourth, Mr. Justice Brennan's view of the paramount

importance of uniformity carries over into Part III, which implies
in text that all the details of a Bivens action must be governed by
uniform federal law.

In particular, the language of the CA adopted

by the Court in p. 9 is instructive:

"The liability of federal

agents for violation of constitutional rights should not depend
upon where the violation occurred • . . "

This bears a strong

resemblance to the "outcome determinative" test once used in the
Erie context, and, as such, is bound to be unworkable.

Indeed,

this reasoning would call into question settled law in the Courts
of Appeals that the statute of limitations in Bivens actions is

FN

borrowed from state law. The footnote takes some of this back,
stating that "it makes some sense to allow aspects of

§

1983

litigation to vary according to [State law]" and that "as to other
survivorship questions • • • , it may be that the federal law should
choose to incorporate state rules as a matter of convenience."
(pp. 9-10 n. 10).
Despite the footnote, I am worried about the broad
language in the text.

The opinion suggests that in Bivens actions

there is a presumption favoring a uniform rule, which is directly
opposite to the statutory presumption favoring state law in
actions. 42 U.S.C.

§

1988.

§

1983

This is contrary to the spirit of Butz

v. Economou, in which the Court suggested it would be unseemly for
federal officers to be governed by different rules than state
officials.

Apparently for this reason, the opinion fails

II

4.
adequately to deal with the contrary precedent in Robertson or to
analyze, as the Court did in Robertson, the effect of applying
state law on the policies underlying the constitutional cause of
action.

Indeed, the Court provides no real guidance for

determining when state law might be "convenient" enouqh to override
the uniformity interest.

Although I could see holding that the

state law in this case is too restrictive to further the federal
policies, I do not agree that there should be a presumption in
·~

~~LA-I~·

favor of federal common law.
CONCLUSION:

---~

Points (2) /1
and (3) are not serious.

could probably be worked out with language changes, and (3)
not be worth protesting about.

(2)
mi ~ ~

(1)
(4) are more troubling.J On
___..... and .....___,__....

the cause of action issue, I suppose you are now bound by Passman.
But it might be worth writing separately to show that you need not
use the "right to damages" analysis to reach this result.
the

As to

the footnote and the outlandish result

of reading the text literally may prevent any untoward results in
future cases.

I also believe that my reaction is colored by what

seems to be back-of-the-hand treatment of a difficult issue.
Accordingly, you may not feel that it is worth the trouble to say
anything different on this point.

On the other hand, I do believe

that the language and analysis of the draft is way too broad,
overstating the interest in uniformity and cutting a wide swath for
federal common law where it is not necessary.

The result is not as

troubling in this case as it is where important State interests are

5.

at stake.

Here, the State has no interest in applying its own law

in federal constitutional actions.

Rather, the problem is the

judicial legislation inherent in adopting uniform federal rules as
often and as broadly as this opinion suqqests.

'

' j

r,
l

~nprtntt

<!Jcurl cf tlrt 'Jlttti:ttb ~fattg

'J)ruJrin-gLttt, ~. <lJ. 20bi'l- ~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 3, 1980

Re:

78-1261 -Carlson v. Green

Dear Bill:
I shall await Bill Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

j)ltprttttt

Qfamf ttf tJr~ 'Jilnit~b ~taUS

._as!rittgLnt. ~. <!J. 20~~~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 3, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1261 - Carlson v. Green

Dear Bill:
In due course I will circulate a dissent in this
case.
Sincerely,

vv/
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

,,,

....... ,

,Si"ttprtlttt <!J"Mtrt

c-f tit~ 2:hittb' .,€;htftg

'J)n;~s! bt jhttt.
CHAM~ERS

ttl. cq.

20gtJf..;l

OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No . 78-1261 - Carlson v. Gree n

Dear Bill :
Please join me.
S i ncere ly,

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

~tm~

<!fonrt of tltt ~b i'mus

Jrasftington. ~.

<If.

2llbi,..;l

CHAMIII!:RS 01'

March 3, 1980

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

78-1261 - Carlson v. Green

Dear Bill,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

A~
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
erne

j;ulJrtmr Qittn.rt of tlrr ')ilnitr~ .§tatrs

'lllaeltingtott, W.

QI.

:!Obi'~2

CHAMBERS OF'

/

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 4, 1980

Re;

No. 78-1261 - Carlson v. Green

Dear Bill:
]?lease join me.
Sincerely,

j./J1.
T.M.

I

'·

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

TO:
FROM:

Ellen

DATE:

January 4, 1980

RE:

No.

78-1261

Carlson v. Green

h . 'Jt#-tt:~--~ ~

.~. ~~.......-~~)4.ec.~
t:.~~. ~tJ-,Iz, ~) ~ - ~

There are two issues:

c

~J ~~ L41..1 ~-

1.

whether

there

shou~raP:tven~ ~n~

damages for deliberate medical mistreatment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, when the victim has an alternate remedy in the
form of a malpractice action against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act?

2.

If there

is such an action,

whether survival of

the action is governed by Indiana statutes that would bar this
claim?
I

On the Bivens issue, my initial impression was that it
is improper to allow plaintiffs to circumvent the procedures of

;/4¢'£.~

'

~177.3

2.

the FTCA by alleging constitutional violations.
convinced me otherwise.
in Davis v.

Passman,

The briefs have

As you pointed out in your concurrence

a damages remedy is not constitutionally

compelled for violations of all constitutional rights.
itself

looked

to

a

variety

of

factors,

and

Bivens

Justice VIlarlan 1 s

concurrence suggested that the Court look to the same sorts of
discretionary policies that a legislature might in fashioning a
remedy.

Brown v. General Services Administration, 425

§

820

looks in the same general direction, although Brown was

(1976),

a

u.s.

action

1981

accordingly

and

primarily

looked

to

congressional intent.
The
alternative

b~

channels of

seems to focus on the adequacy of

enforcement

deterrence and compensation.
the role of congressional

to

serve

the

policies of

The parties have somewhat muddled

intent

in this enteq>rise.

I don 1 t

believe that Congress could properly provide for an exclusive
remedy

unless

Conversely,

the

the

remedy

absence

was
of

also

constitutionally

explicit

congressional

fashion an exclusive remedy is not controlling.
reasons,

I

doubt

that Congress 1

adequate.
intent

to

For the same

intent to provide a parallel

remedy would be absolutely controlling if the redundancy of the
statutory and constitutional actions was apparent.
evidence

However, the

-

a tte ~ dy when it am ~th~ FTCA_t ~ co~ _:o ~ts of

harms alleged in that case is certainly relevant to the question
whether

the

FTCA

is

in

fact

an

effective

alternative

when

3.

constitutional rights have been violated.
In this

case,

I

think

the

SG misleads when he

says

that the FTCA is a "comprehensive remedial scheme for the kind
of claim raised here."
sovereign

immunity

It is not.

and

permit

the United States "where •
to the

claimant

It

remits

Moreover,

the

the recovery of damages

against

in accordance with the law of the place where

2674.

§

,.

. a private person would be liable

the act or omission occurred."
28 U.S.C.

All the FTCA does is waive

28

u.s.c.

§

1346 (b);

see also

This isn't a federal remedial scheme at all.

plaintiff

entirely

to

his

state

law

rights.

the FTCA gives the plaintiff even less than he would

have under state law in many cases,

because it

is hedged with

protections for the United States:

good

1.

The plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages.

2.

He is not entitled to trial by jury.

3.

The United States may well be entitled to use the

faith

protect

or

qualified

individuals,

immunites

not

the

provided

state.

Cf.

by

state

Owen

law

to

City

of

performed

by

v.

Independence.
4.

There

is

an

exception

for

acts

employees "exercising due care in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation is valid."
(P

28

U.S.C.

§

provision

2680(a)

that

would

immunize

many

"

constitutional violations.
5.

There

is

an

exception

for

performance

of

"a

7

4.

discretionary
discretion

function

be

or

abused,"

planning decisions.

whether

duty
which

exempts

Dalehite v.

from

or

not

the

liability

all

United States, 346 U.S.15,

42

(19530.
6.

The plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies

before coming to court.

Not only is the plaintiff subject to "the vagaries of
common

law

actions,"

Bivens,

403

U.S.

at

409

(Harlan,

J.

concurring), but in some cases there will be no damages at all
because of the additional defenses of the FTCA.
deterrent aspects of Bivens
~

as ~ ~

Finally,

the

are not served to the same

extent by actions against the United States.

The SG argues that

~

purpose will be better served because officials will institute
corrective action if liability is
itself.

imposed

upon

the

government

Whatever the validity of this argument, it rests on a

theory quite different from that underlying Bivens.
Here
laws
served

as

regulating
by the

in Bivens,
malpractice

uniformity

interests protected by state

may

be

Eighth Amendment,

stated in Bivens.
in

the

is

for many of

403 U.S., at 394.
disserved

by

inconsistent

the

scheme

specially

modifications violation,

as

adapted

and

those

the same reasons

And the federal interest
FTCA

exclusively to the laws of the 50 states.
a

with

remedy,

which

looks

In short, this is not

designed

with

some

to remedy a particular sort of constitutional
was

Title

VII.

See

Brown

v•

GSA.

It

merely

'IE'

5.

~~Uu_U.S.

authorizes litigants to bring state law claims.
same

situation

prevailed

in

Bivens

itself,

United States was not liable to suit.

Precisely the

except

that

the

The addition of a solvent

defendant to the picture should not change the result.

Although

the petitioner suggests that even Bivens should now come out the
other way, Brief at 33, the alleviation of one of the concerns
expressed

in

that

Indeed,

controlling.
inevitably

decision

leads

to

does

the

the

not
that

fact

abandonment

This conclusion

seem

to

me

to

logic

petitioner's

of

virtually

all

be

Bivens

clear

is buttressed by the Congress'

intention to preserve Bivens claims when it amended the FTCA in
1974 to provide an additional remedy for the same conduct,
brief

Respondent's
Congress

of

government
arising
Amicus

at

attempts

to

liability

out of
Curiae

the
for

by

35-36,
amend

for

all

the

repeated

FTCA

the

to

individual

the

ACLU

Foundation

rejections

substitute

liability

performance of official
at

see

duties,
25-29,

direct

in

cases

see

Brief

and

by

the

concerns expressed by various congressmen that the FTCA remedy
would

be

insufficient without

substantial

changes,

see

id.

at

26-27 and cf. Petitioner's Brief at 37 n. 38.
The public policy concerns raised by the petitioner in
the other direction

are not persuasive.

Brief at

38-39.

The

fact that a suit against ~e government should be preferable to
the

claimant

is

hardly

a

reason

to

deny

him

an

remedy that he may irrationally prefer or that may

0

,I

~

I

alternative
in unusual

6.
circumstances
superiority

(as

here)

be

preferable.

an

FTCA

suit

alleviates

of

"floodgates"

concern

Indeed,
to

so often expressed

in

some
these

the

usual

extent

the

suits.

The

petitioner also says that substitution of government liability
will benefit the public because the fear of personal liability
and the burden of trial dampens the ardor of public officials.
But

the

doctrines

designed

to meet

of

qualified

precisely

and

these

absolute
We

concerns.

immunity
ought

were

not

to

strike a different (and rather one-sided) balance here.
Finally,
question

there

has

been

is not properly before

a

us.

suggestion
Although

it

that

this

is true the

question was not raised below and is not really related to the
argument, made below, that no cause of action should be implied
under

the

eighth

amendment,

it was

which the Court granted cert.

the

principal

question

on

It is a question of considerable

importance and one to which the parties have devoted the lion's
share

of

Although

their
the

briefing.

Court

could

There

is

properly

no

jurisdictional

refuse

to

consider

bar.
the

question, it would probably be preferable to reach it.

II
This issue raises no difficult theoretical questions.
I

am

inclined

to

agree with

the

parties

should generally be treated similarly to
Butz v.

Economou,

Wegman,

436 U.S.

438
584

u.s.
(1978)

478

(1978).

that Bivens
§

actions

1983 actions.

See

Therefore Robertson v.

is the controlling law.

Robertson

I

7.

says

that

state

survival

laws

generally

will

govern

constitutional damages actions against federal officials.

But

the holding there was:
a narrow one, limited to situations in which no
claim
is made
that
state
law generally
is
inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions and in
which
the
particular
application
of
state
survivorship law, while it~ y cause abatement of
the action, has no independent adverse effect on
the ~licies undefTy1n9§ 198 T. • • • A d i'fferent
situation m1ght well be presented . . . if state
law 'did not provide for survival of any tort
actions . . . . We intimate no view, moreover,
/ about whether abatement . . . could be allowed in
a situation in which deprivation of federal rights
caused death.
The debate in this case is over the applicability of
the possible exceptions noted in Robertson, all of which seem to
turn principally on an analysis of whether application of the
state

law

of

survival

would

frustrate

constitutional damages actions.

the

purposes

of

The issues here are muddied by

a dispute over the Indiana law.
The

petitioner

"survive" to some extent.

says

is

completely

action for

all

actions

Indiana

abated,

in the sense that the victim's

Indiana

provides

for

a

separate

the victim's personal representative to sue in his

own right or to recover damages for next of kin.
legal sense a separate claim.
differently

in

Although personal injury actions that

cause a death do not "survive"
claim

that

for

purposes

of

This is in a

But whether it should be treated
our

analysis

is

not

clear.

The

point should not be how the actions are labelled, for once the
victim is dead the same people are likely to end up with the

8.

recovery whether the action be labelled "survival" or "wrongful
As

death."

long

as

the

constitutional

claim

of

a

victim can be asserted in a wrongful death action,
inclined

to

take

the

petitioner's view and

lump

together to see, in sum, what may be recovered.
whether Indiana law would permit a

/

~

deceased

I would be

both

actions

We do not know

constitutional claim to be

brought under the wrongful death statute, but I have no reason
to believe this would not be permissible.

Accordingly,

I will

,)

assume that damages would be available under Indiana law for the
items provided in that statute.
In
recovery

the

provided

particular
for

inadequate.
______.

woefully
leaving

no

limitation

-

widow
on

or

damages

the

circumstances

allegedly

But

that

is

the

because

relative.
_____,
these

this

case,

the

unconstitutional death

dependent
in

of

I

victim

doubt

circumstances

would

~

is ~
lA ......~~r..-

died 9......._t ·
~~~

that

the ~··

have

any

4-~

....,..
I

significant effect on the policies underlying Bivens.
petitioner points out,

the survival of

may often create a windfall
unrelated heirs.

At least,

personal

As

the ~

injury claims

to nondependent relatives or even
the policy of compensation is less

compelling when the victim has died leaving no nuclear family or
dependent relatives.
The
the

problem of deterrence

statutes,

taken

together,

do

recoveries when the victim has died.
reduce

recoveries only

here.

I

doubt

that

in
the

the

is more
not

completely

But

eliminate

Indeed, they significantly

special

prospect

troublesome.

of

circumstances
"getting

presented

off"

without

9.

damages liability when a prospective victim has no family would
significantly affect the conduct of federal officials who know
that

in cases where

the victim survives or leaves a widow or

dependents he may have to answer in damages.
I

am

somewhat

troubled

by

this

aspect

of

the

case

because it seems to place the Court at large to make predictive
judgments

as

it

sees

fit

on

whether

rules

of

law

will

Because I see no real benefit ~

"adequately" compensate or deter.

liberal ~

in the creation of a federal rule of survivorship more

than that provided by Indiana law, I would be inclined to avoid ~
this

exercise

legislative

in

creating

area.

Even

common

though

law

the

rules

Court

in

has

~

a

largely ~~

done

so

~

admiralty to a certain extent, Moragne v. States Marine Lines,

~

Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405-498 (1970), there are too many outright ~
policy

questions

actions:

in

fashioning

survival

Who is entitled to sue?

and

wrongful

death

For what items of damages?

The absence of a body of common law precedent would seem to me
to make these questions excruciatingly difficult unless we look
to state law.

For these reasons, I lean to reverse the CA7 and

hold

act ion was

that

the

Indiana law.

properly dismissed

is

some

compelling

reason

to

underlying Bivens would be compromised.

CONCLUSION

....

the

bas is

But I don't feel strongly one way or the other

this question and could easily be persuaded
there

on

of

the

~
~

~
~~

~
ri,.

~

o~

the other way if

believe

~

policies

1 0.

On

the

first

issue,

I

believe

the

FTCA

cannot

be

interpreted as the exclusive remedy for the injury caused by the
alleged constitutional violation in this case.
obtains in this case,

If that result

it would be difficult to distinguish the

whole array of Bivens actions - indeed, the SG's brief strongly
suggests that he would now apply the same rule to the facts of
Bivens
actions

itself.

This

entirely.

logic
While

seems designed to eliminate Bivens
the

Bivens

action

arguably

has

contributed little to enforcement of constitutional obligations
while clogging the courts with amorphous suits governed by no
easily discernible laws, it would seem disingenuous to overrule
it indirectly in the way proposed by the SG.
On

the

second

issue,

the

analysis

straightforward but the result, in my view, less clear.

is

more
I would

lean to adopt the Indiana law of survivorship and reverse the
CA7, with the result that the action will be barred.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w.. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

RE:

January 10, 1980

No. 78-1261

Carlson v. Green

Dear Chief:
I'll undertake the opinion for the Court
in the above.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss 3/13/80

78-~2l
v

CARLSON v. GREEN

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the
judgment.
Although I join the judgment, I do not
agree with much of the language in the Court's
opinion.

The principles said to govern a Bivens

cause of action are stated as follows:
"Bivens established that the victims of a
constitutional violation
• have a
right to recover damages
• • Such a
cause of action may be defeated • . • in
two situations. The first is when
defendants demonstrate 'special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress' . .. , T~e
second is when defendants show that
Congress has provided an alternative
remedy which is explicitly declared to be
a substitute for recovery directly under
the Constitution and viewed as egyall3
ef£ect ~"
Ante, at 3-4 J (first emphasis
added, second-rn-original).

Much
dicta.

of the foregoing language is unnecessary
Moreover, it goes beyond any prior holding

by this Court.

!

ft( I

Ll) 1()7/
I

We are concerned here with implying a

(rv

dJ Wfl

of actio~ from the Constitution0 wnen none is
~I

have thought that the b rden was on

the party asserting such a
establish the

inadequ~y

or absence of other

remedies (Ellen - if I am correct, please cite

I

'·

Ot!r
-c-ases).

(.P./;e;J

~ ~

bf-

2.

.fi/

fl7lfYih.

-~w. 'pv,.c.fW dMw h~
~~

J

'Piie Coorl now would shi-i'

tire- burden,

~nd ~~~~~~

require that a defendant show that Congress has
provided "an alternative remedy which it explicitly
declared to be a substitute" for a Bivens cause of
action, and that Congress viewed its remedy "as
equally effective".

These are unnecessarily

\

inflexible conditions. ~or does the Court suggest

consideratio~ for

any policy

imposing such a

threshold burden on a defendant in an implied
r

/

remedy case. ( If the Court's language is taken
literally, the question is not merely whether
Congress has prescribed an adequate remedy.

(

Even

{f'
iisuch a remedy is entirely adequate, the defendant

also must show that Congress has "explicitly

--------

declared (its remedy] to be a substitute for
recovery directly under the Constitution".
Absent such an explicit showing, the
Court apparently

thin~s

0

a Bivens plaintiff may

ignore an a~uate congressional remedy.

It ~

makes no sense, in such a situation, to afford a

plaintif~ choice of two

federal remedies,

especially where one is implied and the other

(f-

~)

3.

affirmatively provided by Congress.

a rule

would ~ke irreleva~ other
CVl' 1'-

congressional intent.
presumptuous

~

r

Moreouer,

~ uch

evidence of

~..~

OJ

I

~ -J.ui,

I also view it as

cr t.v-e \

c

instruct Congress on the form as

well as the substance of its legislation.

t

The Cour; rdoes state that a Bivens cause
of action may be defeated if a defendant
demonstrates "special factors" counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
1

\~1c~rl Jl
Congress.

But no guidance i S-afforded by the

\

\! c

L-1'

II
I
~ op1nion - as to this possiol J except ~on.
I

I(

Gl

I

It

'/&

states simply that no snch :Eae-t-e-rSare present in
this case, and that petitioners enjoy no
(\

;\~'\..AC'

" 1dependent status" that would make "judicially
created remedies against them inappropriate".

~~~~,Q~r:- ~ ~ficia~'~:a~~s ~f
t<>

f'J\Q k ()._ \\
is 'mmediately
follows
l

'"'

diluted ~ b¥ ~ the

the

(§·~
Aph ~

def~n~aftt

sentence that

-I n it ') the Court states that even if

1

defending a Bivens suit "might inhibit [performance
of] official duties, the qualified immunity
lA

accorded • • • under Butz v. Economo J . • •
(\

provides adequte protection".

'\
In sum, the Court identifies no special

(2k'c'J2

l 1~

4.

factors relevant to its purported exception.

cwJvcrvl

c~

(>

,

eagerness of this Court to impTy federal cause& of
"'«etioll that are authorized neither by the

Constitution nor by Congress is, in my view, a

~en-:_.

disservice both to the doctrine of separation of

~

powers and to a rational system of iustice.

Nok

·3

v:.-

e,...UA-- CJ..

(Ellen, add a cite to my dissent in Cannon, and

11
possibly other cites).
~

II

This is not

~A
to~

hat in appropriate

circumstances private causes of action may

~

inferred from provisions of the Constitution.

be

i-(L-/2. (!)

ly

(Ellen:

\
K5.1

cite my Passman disssent).

Thy Court

~

recognized, Bivens, supra, at 397, and this Court
again today acknowledges, that Congress is the
appropriate body to create federal remedies.
Althouqh the Court's opinion imposes new
requirements as to when a congressionally
prescribed remedy supplants the right to bring a
Bivens suit, the Court has never gone so far as to
say that Congress cannot provide an exclusive
remedy.

This being so, logic would require that -

absent congressional action - a federal court in

Z.SZ..

1

5.

deciding whether to imply a remedy should exercise
the sort of discretion that one would expect from a
legislative body. As Mr. Justice Harlan noted, a
court should "take into account [a range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of
those a legislature would consider with respect to
an express statutory authorization of a traditional
remedy".

Bivens, supra, at 407.

It is difficult

to know from today's decision, written in
absolutist terms, whether the "discretion" of a
court is now reduced to determining simply whether
there is a legislative remedy that

both comports

in substance and form with the Court's new
requirements.
Despite my serious disagreement with
languaqe of the opinion, I do agree with the
Court's conclusion that this is a proper case for a
Bivens cause of action.

The Federal Tort Claims

Act, relied upon by petitioner, does not provide an

y

adequte remedy*; indeed, as the
*Ellen, Include a summary note as to why the
statutory remedy is inadequate.

6.

Court points out, the legislative history makes
reasonably clear that Congress did not intend

st<J.s\ a..+-M v

(

foreclose a Bivens suit.

Mareove~,

cens iderat ions --to the eentr ar-J

s

ha ~

·he

}O
LJ

o policy

~

been identified

by any of the parties.

III
In part III of its opinion, the Court adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals holds that "whenever the relevant state survival
statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought
against defendants whose conduct results in death,
the federal common law allows survival of the
action."

Ante, at 9.

plA ·p (/)I'~

that ~elevant

I agree
consideration)

t f-?Jlv"&vv)

a,_~,. 1 c...._

policy

require the application of

~deral
1

Ow

IUJ \r

Cl-~~

common law to allow survival in this case. _ Thgre

th~ . opi n i however, t~~!l_;e,.~~ ~1fo~ _A
,~ cY fCVOJNI.i t.tt~A ·, Q L . _p t~~' dJ~ r.lA;v \ vJ oc.R.£7' J
1

. is 1 angnage in

~

r

(1

~

C sbonl d

t ha

..ae

. /'

.

.

, _,_._,

t

1n B1vens act1ons ge.n.e-ra-r .... i , L Iere L.

(a uniform federal rule.

----.::.:.

t..a

QJ:l.-y

It is not clear

to me that the Court would go this far.

See n. 10,

p. 9-10, infra, and it would be quite unnecessary
in this case to adopt any such uniform rule.

'

7.

Moreover, this would be incompatible with the
statutory presumption favoring state law in §1983
actions.

42 U.S.C. §1988.

It also would be

contrary to the spirit of Butz v. Economou in which
the Court indicated that it would be unseemly for
federal officers to be governed by different rules
than state officers.

At least, where statutes of

limitation are at issue, I have thought it settled
that in both Bivens and 1983 actions the federal
courts applied state statutes of limitations.
(Ellen:

cite a case or two).

lfp/ss 3/13/80
78-1621 CARLSON v. GREEN
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the
judgment.
Although I join the judgment, I do not
agree with much of the language in the Court's
opinion.

The principles said to govern a Bivens

cause of action are stated as follows:
"Bivens established that the victims of a
constitutional violation
• have a
right to recover damages
• • Such a
cause of action may be defeated • • . in
two situations. The first is when
defendants demonstrate 'special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress'. The
second is when defendants show that
Congress has provided an alternative
remedy which is explicitly declared to be
a substitute for recovery directly under
the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective." Ante, at 3-4 (first emphasis
added, second-rn-original).

Much
dicta.

of the foregoing language is unnecessary
Moreover, it goes beyond any prior holding

by this Court.
I

We are concerned here with implying a
cause of action from the Constitution when none is
specified.

I have thought that the burden was on

the party asserting such a right at least to
establish the inadequacy or absence of other
remedies (Ellen - if I am correct, please cite

2.

cases).
The Court now would shift the burden, and
require that a defendant show that Congress has
provided "an alternative remedy which it explicitly
declared to be a substitute" for a Bivens cause of
action, and that Congress viewed its remedy "as
equally effective".

These are unnecessarily

inflexible conditions.

Nor does the Court suggest

any policy considerations for imposing such a
threshold burden on a defendant in an implied
remedy case.

If the Court's language is taken

literally, the question is not merely whether
Congress has prescribed an adequate remedy.

i ~ uch

Even

a remedy is entirely adequate, the defendant

also must show that Congress has "explicitly
declared [its remedy] to be a substitute for
recovery directly under the Constitution".
Absent such an explicit showing, the
Court apparently thinks a Bivens plaintiff may
ignore an adquate congressional remedy.

It simply

makes no sense, in such a situation, to afford a
plaintif;!a choice of two federal remedies,
especially where one is implied and the other

3.

affirmatively provided by Congress.

Moreover, such

a rule would make irrelevant other evidence of
congressional intent.

I also view it as

presumptuous to instruct Congress on the form as
well as the substance of its legislation.
The Court does state that a Bivens cause
of action may be defeated if a defendant
demonstrates "special factors" counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by

~k.eJ-'3.
_
,
Congress.

But no guidance is afforded by the-

!\
Cotn·t '...s -apinig.n as to this possible exception.

It

states simply that no such factors are present in
this case, and that petitioners enjoy no
"idependent status" that would make "judicially

~,J ifcreated remedies against them inappropriate".

This
A

reference to the official status of the defendant
is immediately diluted by the sentence that
follows.

In it, the Court states that even if

defending a Bivens suit "might inhibit (performance
of] official duties, the qualified immunity
accorded • . • under Butz v. Economos . • •
(j...J

provides

adequ~e

protect ion".

In sum, the Court identifies no special

4.

factors relevant to its purported exception.

The

eagerness of this Court to imply federal causes of
action that are authorized neither by the
Constitution nor by Congress is, in my view, a
disservice both to the doctrine of separation of
powers and to a rational system of justice.
(Ellen, add a cite to my dissent in Cannon, and
possibly other cites).
II

This is not to say that in appropriate
circumstances private causes of action may not be
inferred from provisions of the Constitution.
(Ellen:

cite my Passman disssent).

The Court

~

recognized)\ Bivens, supra, at 397, and this Court
again today acknowledges, that Congress is the
appropriate body to create federal remedies.
Although the Court's opinion imposes new
requirements as to when a congressionally
prescribed remedy supplants the right to bring a
Bivens suit, the Court has never gone so far as to
say that Congress cannot provide an exclusive
remedy.

This being so, logic would require that -

absent congressional action - a federal court in

5.

deciding whether to imply a remedy should exercise
the sort of discretion that one would expect from a
legislative body. As Mr. Justice Harlan noted, a
court should "take into account [a range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of
those a legislature would consider with respect to
an express statutory authorization of a traditional
remedy".

Bivens, supra, at 407.

It is difficult

to know from today's decision, written in
absolutist terms, whether the "discretion" of a
court is now reduced to determining simply whether
there is a legislative remedy that

both comports

in substance and form with the Court's new
requirements.
Despite my serious disagreement with
language of the opinion, I do agree with the
Court's conclusion that this is a proper case for a
Bivens cause of action.

The Federal Tort Claims

Act, relied upon by petitioner, does not provide an
adequte remedy*; indeed, as the
*Ellen, 1nclude a summary note as to why the
statutory remedy is inadequate.

6.

Court points out, the legislative history makes
reasonably clear that Congress did not intend to
foreclose a Bivens suit.

Moreover, no policy

considerations to the contrary have been identified
by any of the parties.

III
In part III of its opinion, the Court adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals holds that "whenever the relevant state survival
statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought
against defendants whose conduct results in death,
the federal common law allows survival of the
action."

Ante, at 9.
I agree that relevant policy

considerations require the application of a federal
common law to allow survival in this case.

There

is language in the opinion, however, that seems to
suggest that in Bivens actions generally, there
should be a uniform federal rule.

It is not clear

to me that the Court would go this far.

See n. 10,

p. 9-10, infra, and it would be quite unnecessary
in this case to adopt any such uniform rule.

7.

Moreover, this would be incompatible with the
statutory presumption favoring state law in §1983
actions.

42 U.S.C. §1988.

It also would be

contrary to the spirit of Butz v. Economou in which
the Court indicated that it would be unseemly for
federal officers to be governed by different rules
than state officers.

At least, where statutes of

limitation are at issue, I have thought it settled
that in both Bivens and 1983 actions the federal
courts applied state statutes of limitations.
(Ellen:

cite a case or two).

.;§u:punu <!Juttrl uf flrt ~tth .;§httt.G'
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 13, 1980

Re:

78~1261

~•

Carlson• v.

Gre~n

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

fJL
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

/

If

March 13,
~

~~:

~~,~

\\

Carlson v. Green

Dear Bill:
Althouqh I
your opinion for the Court.
Passman, and your draft
- the Passman analysis.

am not able to join
we went too far in
- perhaps understandably

I will await
decidinq what to do.

dissent before
Court • '

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference
~~,

1~
w-vt1;; ~

4:J-·,.
(/'iii,:

er 3/18/80

78-1261 CARLSON v. GREEN
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the
judgment.
Although I join the judgment, I do not
agree with much of the language in the Court's
opinion.

The Court states the principles

governing Bivens actions as follows:
"Bivens established that the victims of a
const1tutional violation
• have a
right to recover damages
. . Such a
cause of action may be defeated • • • in
two situations. The first is when
defendants demonstrate 'special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress • . • . The
second is when defendants show that
Congress has provided an alternative
remedy which is explicitly declared to be
a substitute for recovery directly under
the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective. • • " Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis
in original).

holdings of this
Court.
I

We are concerned here with implying a
right of action for damages directly from the
Constitution.

In the past, the Court has said that

persons who have "no [other] effective means of
redress" "must be able to invoke the existing
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of

2.

their justiciable constitutional rights."
Passman, 442
in itself

u.s.

~Flfines

228, 242 (1979).

Davis v.

The Davis rule

the "principled discretion" that

""

should be brought to bear when a court is asked to
infer a private cause of action not specified by
the enacting authority.
dissenting).

Id., at 252 (POWELL, J.,

15 ~IJ. ~
i LI '
But the Court ..s.e~ -. b.en L o.n
...

'

eliminat ~

every vestige of discretion.

\

Today we

are tol d that a court must entertain a Bivens suit
unless the action is "defeated" in one of tw6
specified ways.
The Court recognized in Bivens that the
need for implied remedies may be obviated when
Congress has supplied "equally effective
alternative remedies."

Id., at 248; see Bivens v.

Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
397

u.s.

388,

(1971).

defendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by
showing that there are adequate alternative avenues
of relief.

The defendant must also show that

Congress "explicitly declared [its remedy] to be a
substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective."

3.

These are unnecessarily inflexible conditions.

The

l

policy reason - indeed no reason
at all - for imposing this threshold burden upon
the defendant in an implied remedy case.
The Court implicitly acknowledges that
Congress possesses the power to enact adequate
alternative remedies that would be exclusive.

~
11 per;;~
~ B1vens
.

Yet,

.
'ff s to
p 1a1nt1

.
today's op1n1on
w1

"

ignore entirely adequate remedies if Congress has
not clothed them in the

~
~linguistic

garb.

No

purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice
of remedies in these circumstances.

~~~;~

Nor dees it

courts to close their eyes
1 '1ntent t h at
.
t o congress1ona

~~hi

~
1 not~ expresse d '1n

prefers.

Indeed, I would

have thought it presumptuous for this Court to
instruct Congress on the form its legislation must
take.
The Court does state that the Bivens
remedy may be defeated if "special factors" counsel
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress.

But no further guidance is provided.

The Court states simply that no such factors are

4.

present in this case, and that petitioners enjoy no
"independent status" that would make judicially
created remedies inappropriate.

Ante, at 4.

The

implication that official status may be a "special
factor" is withdrawn in the sentence that follows,
which concludes that qualified immunity affords all
the protection necessary to the effective
performance of official duties.

No other factors

relevant to the purported exception are mentioned.
One is left to wonder whether judicial
discretion in this area will hereafter be confined
to the single determination that a legislative
remedy does or does not comport with the
specifications prescribed by this Court.

Such a

drastic curtailment of discretion would be
inconsistent with the Court's longstanding
recognition that Congress is ultimately the
appropriate body to create federal remedies.

See

ante, at 4-5; Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, supra, 403

u.s.,

at 397.

A plaintiff who

seeks his remedy directly under the Constitution
asks the federal courts to perform an essentially
legislative task.

As Mr. Justice Harlan once said,

5.

a court should "take into account [a range of
policy considerations] at least as broad as the
range of those a legislature would consider with
respect to

~n

express statutory authorization of a

-traditional remedy".

Bivens, supra, at 407.

I do

not understand why this discretion must be limited
in the manner announced today.
The Court's absolutist language is the
more puzzling for its adoption in a case where the
implied remedy is so plainly appropriate under any
measure of

di~cretion.

The Federal Tort Claims

Act, relied on by petitioners, simply is not an
adequate remedy.l/ And there are reasonably clear
indications that Congress did not intend that
statute to displace Bivens claims.
5.

See ante, at 4-

No substantial contrary policy has been

identified, and I am aware of none.

I therefore

agree that a private damages remedy properly is
inferred from the Constitution in this case.

But I

do not agree that Bivens plaintiffs have a "right"
to this remedy whenever the defendant fails to make
the showing required today. In my view, the Court's
eagerness to imply federal causes of action that

6.

cannot be found in Constitution or statute is an
affront to the doctrine of separation of powers and
a disservice to a rational system of justice.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441

u.s.

Cf.

677, 730-

749 (POWELL, J., dissenting).2/
II
In part III of its opinion, the Court
holds that "'whenever the relevant state survival
statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought
against defendants whose conduct results in death,
the federal common law allows survival of the
action.'"
675.

~,at

9, quoting 581 F.2d, at 674-

I agree that the relevant policies require

the application of federal common law to allow
survival in this case.

-

It is not [s g "obvious" to me that "the
liability of federal officials for violations of
citizens' constitutional rights should be governed
by uniform rules" in every case.
id., at 9.

Ante at BJ see

On the contrary, federal courts

routinely refer to state law to fill the procedural
gaps in national remedial schemes.

The policy

against invoking the federal common law except

7.

where necessary to the vitality of a federal claim
is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which creates a
presumption in favor of state law in

§

1983

actions.
The Court's opinion in this case stops
short of mandating uniform rules to govern all
aspects of Bivens actions. Ante, at 9-10 n. 10.
But it appears designed - at the least - to reverse
in Bivens actions the presumption applicable under
§

1983.

The distinction is both unnecessary to the

analysis of this case and contrary to the spirit of
Butz v. Economou, 438
(1978).

u.s.

478, 498-504 & n. 25

In Butz, the Court indicated that it would

be unseemly for different rules to govern the
liability of federal and state officers for the
same constitutional harm.
understanding today.

I would not disturb that

er 3/18/80
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The FTCA is not a federal remedial

scheme at all, but a waiver of sovereign immunity
that permits an injured claimant to recover damages
against the United States "where • • • a private
person would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act
1346(b)~

or omission occurred."

28 U.S.C.

also 28 U.S.C.

Here, as in Bivens itself,

§

2674.

§

see

a plaintiff who is denied his constitutional remedy
would be remitted to the vagaries of state law. See
403 U.S., at 394-395.

The FTCA gives the plaintiff

even less than he would receive under state law in
many cases, because the statute is hedged with
protections for the United States.

As the Court

points out, neither punitive damages nor jury trial
are available under the FTCA.

Ante, at 7-8.

And

recovery may be barred altogether if the claim
involves a "discretionary function," 28

u.s.c.

2679(a), or "the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation is valid," 28 U.S.C.

§

2680(a).

§

FN2.

~/

I do not imply that courts enjoy the

same degree of freedom to imply causes of action
from statutes as they do from the Constitution.
See Davis v. Passman, 442

u.s.

228, 241-242 (1979).

I do believe, however, that the Court has seriously
overstepped the bounds of rational judicial
decisionmaking in both contexts.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the
judgment.
Although I join the iudgment, I do not
t
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"
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I

•

agree with much of the language in the Court's
opinion.

The Court states the principles

governing Bivens actions as follows:
"Bivens established that the victims of a
const1tutional violation
. have a
right to recover damages
. • Such a
cause of action may be defeated • • . in
two situations. The first is when
defendants demonstrate 'special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress! • • . The
second is when defendants show that
Congress has provided an alternative
re~ wh1ch ~ explicitly declared to be
a substitute fSr recovery directly under
the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective. • • " Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis
in original).
----

tl... ;>

The foregoing statement contains dicttm ' that goes
well beyond the prior holdings of this Court.
I

We are concerned here with
right of action for damages directly from the
Constitution.

In the past, the Court has said that

persons who have "no [other] effective means of
redress" "must be able to invoke the existing
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of
their justiciable constitutional rights."

Davis v.

2.

Passman, 442

u.s.

I
228, 242 (1979).

The Davis rule

now sets the boundaries of the "principled
discretion" that must be brought to bear when a
court is asked to infer a private cause of action

j
~·,

not specified by the enacting authority.
252 (POWELL, J., dissenting).

at

But the Court's

opinion, read literally, would restrict that
discretion dramatically.

Today we are told that a

court must entertain a Bivens suit unless the
action is "defeated" in one of two specified ways.
As the Court recognized in Bivens, the
need for implied remedies may be obviated when
Congress has supplied "equally effective
alternative remedies."

Id., at 248; see Bivens v.

Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
397 (1971).

u.s.

388,

The Court now volunteers the view that

a defendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by
showing that there are adequate alternative avenues
of relief.

The

defendan~ show

that

Congress "explicitly declared [its remedy] to be a
substitute for recovery directly under the

~

.J 4 ( ~wrt,~
ill\

o'l-'4,-t.-"'-e.J

Constitution and viewed [i,t~ as equally effective." )-----~

01.(1'

These are unnecessarily

/

'nfl~e conditions.

/\
The

,;.

3.

Court cites no authority and advances no policy
reason - indeed no reason at all - for imposing
this threshold burden upon the defendant in an
implied remedy case.

The Court

~licitly acknowledg~

that Congress possesses the power to enact adequate
alternative remedies that would be exclusive.

Yet,

today's opinion apparently will permit Bivens
plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies if
Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed
linguistic garb.

No purpose is served by affording

plaintiffs a choice of remedies in these
circumstances.

Nor do our prior cases require

federal courts to close their eyes to congressional
intent that may not be expressed in the language we
prescribe.

Indeed, I would have thought it

/
theA fo~its

presumptuous for this Court to instruct Congress on
e~f(_

legislation must take.

A defendant may also defeat the Bivens

remedy under today's decision if "special factors"
counsel hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress.

But the Court supplies no

0~ f~ ,~Jfurther

~ opinion states simply that

4.

no such factors are present in this case, and

Q"'-

th~ S(~

s)
petitioners enjoy no "independent statu ~• that
o(..Vt

f"•

would make judicially created remedies
inappropriate.

Ante, at 4.

The implication that

-

~

official status} may be a "special factor" is
withdrawn in the sentence that follows, which
concludes that qualified immunity affords all the

en~../
protection necessary to) the effective performance
of official duties.

No other factors relevant to

the purported exception are mentioned.
One is left to wonder whether judicial
discretion in this area will hereafter be confined
to the single determination that a legislative
remedy does or does not comport with the
specifications prescribed by this Court.

Such a

drastic curtailment of discretion would be
inconsistent with the Court's longstanding
recognition that Congress is ultimately the
appropriate body to create federal remedies.

See

ante, at 4-5; Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, supra, 403

u.s.,

at 397.

A plaintiff who

seeks his remedy directly under the Constitution
asks the federal courts to perform an essentially

5.

Justice Harlan once said,

legislative task.

a court should "take into account [a range of
policy considerations] at least as broad as the
range of those a legislature would consider with
respect to an express statutory authorization of a

/

traditional remed ~ Bivens, supra, at 407.

~
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I do
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not understand why this discretion ~be limited
in the manner announced today.
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·~ The Court's
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more puz zl in
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absolu~ language i~
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a case where the

implied remedy is so plainly appropriate under any
measure of discretion.

The Federal Tort Claims

Act, relied on by petitioners, simply is not an
adequate remedy.1/ And there are reasonably clear
indications that Congress did not intend that
statute to displace Bivens claims.
5.

See ante, at 4-

No substantial contrary policy has been

identified, and I am aware of none.

I therefore

agree that a private damages remedy properly is
inferred from the Constitution in this case.

But I

do not agree that Bivens plaintiffs have a "right"
to this remedy whenever the defendant fails to make
the showing required today. In my view, the Court's

6.

. r

7

,

eagerness to imply federal causes of action that
cannot be found in Constitution or statute is an
affront to the doctrine of separation of powers and
a disservice to a rational system of justice.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441

u.s.

Cf.

677, 730-

{:1'1
J. , dissenting)
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II
In part III of its opinion, the Court
holds that "'whenever the relevant state survival
statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought
against defendants whose conduct results in death,
the federal common law allows survival of the
action.'"

Ante, at 9, quoting 581

~
~ agree

6t~.

F.2d~4-

that the relevant policies require

the application of federal common law to allow
survival in this case.
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that
"the liability of federal officials for violations
of citizens' constitutional rights should be
governed by uniform rules" in every case.
8: see id., at 9.

Ante at

On the contrary, federal courts

routinely refer to state law to fill the procedural
gaps in national remedial schemes.

The policy

7.

against invoking the federal common law except
where necessary to the vitality of a federal claim
is codified in 42

u.s.c.

1988, which creates a

§

~

presumption in favor of state law in

1983

actions.
The Court's opinion in this case stops
short of mandating uniform rules to govern all
aspects of Bivens actions. Ante, at 9-10 n. 10.
But it appears designed I
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analysis of this case and contrary to the spirit of
Butz v. Economou, 438
(1978).
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478, 498-504 & n. 25

the Court indicated that it would

be unseemly for different rules to govern the
liability of federal and state officers for the
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The FTCA is not a federal remedial

scheme at all, but a waiver of sovereign immunity
that permits an injured claimant to recover damages
against the United States "where • • • a private

pers~d

be liable to the claimant in

accordance with the law of the place where the act

v

u.s.c.

or omission occurred."

28

also 28 U.S.C.

Here, as in Bivens itself,

§

2674.

§

1346(b): see

a plaintiff who is denied his constitutional remedy
would be remitted to the vagaries of state law. See

vi

403 U.S., at 394-395.

The FTCA gives the plaintiff

even less than he would receive under state law in
many cases, because the statute is hedged with
protections for the United States.

As the Court

points out, neither punitive dama~s/ nor ~ury trial
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care / available under the FTCA.

Ante, at7~ -

recovery may be barred altogether if the claim
involves a "discretionary function"

or "the

execution of a statute or regulation, whether or
not such statute or regulation is valid."

u.s.c.

§

2680(a).

28
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~/ I do not ~ that courts enjoy the

same degree of freedom to

\~~uses

of action

from statutes as they do from the Constitution.
See Davis v. Parsman, 442

u.s.

228, 241-242 (1979).

I do believe, however, that the
overstepped the bounds of rational judicial
decisionmaking in both contexts.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states 'the
principles governing Bivens actions as follows!
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional
violation ... have a right to recover damages. . . . Such
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations.
'The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
by Congress.' . . . The second is when defendants
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective. . . ." Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis in original).
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond
the prior holdings of this Court.

I
We are concerned here with inferring a right of action for
damages directly from the Constitution. In Davis v. Pass-\
man, 442 U. S. 228, 242 ( 1979), the Court said that persons
who have "no [other] effective means of redress" "must be

78-1261-CONCUR
2

CARLSON v. GREEN

able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." A The
Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "principled discre~
tion" that must be brought to bear when a court is asked to
infer a private cause of action not specified b aut ority.
!d., at 252 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But the Court's opinion,
read literally, would restrict that discretion dramatically.
Today we are told that a court must entertain a Bivens suit
unless the action is "defeated" in one of two specified ways.
Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be unneces~
sary when Congress has ~'equa y effective;'-alterna~
tive remedies. Bivens v. Si~- Un"known Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971); see Davis v. Passman, supra, 442
U. S., at 248. The Court now volunteers the view that a de~
fendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The de:fendant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed [it] as equ·a lly effective." Ante, at
4 (emphasis in original). These are unnecessarily rigid con~
ditions. The Court cites no authority and advances no policy
reason-indeed no reason at all-for imposing this threshold!
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case.
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies
that would be exclusive. Yet, today's opinion apparently will
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic
garb. No purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice of
remedies in these circumstances. Nor clo OY+ fl~io~ eases'""
~ federal courts to blind themselves to congressional
intent expressed in language other than that which we
prescribe.
A defendant also ma.y defeat the Bivens remedy under
today's decision if "special factors" counsel "hesita.tion." But
the Court provides no further guidance on this point. The

~aM-j/~ ?
w~ ,;1..(.~;( ~t1
'·~
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3

opinion states simply that no such factors are present in this
case. The Court says that petitioners enjoy no "independent I
status in our constitutional scheme" that would make judicially ereated remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 4. Bu!}mpli-1
cation that official status may be a "special factor" IS withdrawn in the sentence that follows, which concludes that
qualified immunity affords all the protection necessary to
ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other
factors relevant to the purported exception are mentioned.
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area
will hereafter be confined to the question of alternative remedies, which is in turn reduced to the single determination that
congressional action does or does not comport with the specifications prescribed by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's longstanding recognition that Congress is ultimately the appropriate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5;
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essentially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan
once said, a court should "take into account [a range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express statutory
authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supra, at
407. The Court does not explain why this discretion shouldl
be limited in the manner announced today.
The Court's absolute language is all the more puzzlingf
because it comes in a case where the implied remedy is plainly
appropriate under any measure of discretion. The Federal
Tort Claims Act, on which petitioners rely, simply is not an I
adequate remedy. 1 And there are reasonably clear indications

I

1 The Federal Tort Claims Act is not a federal remedial scheme at all,
but a waiver of sovereign immunity that permits an injured claimant to
recover damages against the United States where a private person "would

1

(~

L
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that Congress did not intend that statute to displace Bivens
claims. See ante, at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has
been identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore agree
that a private damages remedy properly is inferred from the
Constitution in this case. But I do not agree that Bivens
plaintiffs have a "right" to such a remedy whenever the
defendant fails to show that Congress has "provided an
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it explicitly
declared to be a substitute . ..." In my view, tho Court's
1(._--.,._,SIQg~!e~ITlii'l:!~SS to infer federal causes of action that cannot be
found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a
rational system ~e. -cr. cannon v. Tln"iversity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-749 (1979) (PowELL, J., dissenting). 2
II
In Part III of its opinion, the Court holds that " 'whenever
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in
death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.' H
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S. C.§ 1346 (b); see also 28 U.S. C.
·§ 2674. Here, as in Bivens itself, a plaintiff denied his constitutional
remedy would be rPmittcd to the vagaries of state law. Sec 403 U. S., at
394-395. The FTCA gives the plaintiff even less than he would receive
under state law in many cases, because the statute is hcd~ed with protections for the United States. As the Court points out, the FTCA allows
neither jury trial nor punitive damages. Ante, at 7. And recovery may
be barred altogether if the claim arises from a "discretionary function" or
"the execution of a statute or rp~ulat.ion, whether or not such statute or
regulation is valid." 28 U.S. C.§ 2680 (a).
2 I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer
causes of action from statutes as from the Constitution. See Davis v.
Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 241-242 (1979). I do believe, however, that the
Court today has overstepped the bounds of rational judicial decisionmaking in both contexts.

l
I
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agree that the relevant policies require the application of
federal common law to allow survival in this case.
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national remedial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal common law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not
covered by the "laws of the United States."
The Court's opinion in this case does stop short of mandating uniform rules to govern all aspects of Bivens actions.
Ante, at 9-10, n. 10. But the Court also says that the preference for state law embodied in § 1988 is irrelevant to the
selection of rule·s that will govern actions against federal officers under Bivens. Ibid. I · ~. - n Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 498-504, and n. 25 (1978), the
Court thought it unseemly that different rules should govern
the liability of federal a.nd sta,t e officers for similar constitutionall-la :ms. I would not disturb that understanding today.

-
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states the
principles governing Bivens actions as follows:
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional
violation ... have a right to recover damages. . . . Such
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations.
The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
by Congress.' . . . The second is when defendants
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective. . . ." Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis in original).
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond
the prior holdings of this Court.

I

We are concerned here with inferring a right~; ~::~r -:D"uis ~. Pa>SIW!M.>
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diction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable
constitutional rights." f:Je/I:Jis v. Pe.tBS7nttn, 442 U. 8. 228, 242 (t""
(1Q7Q7-:r' The Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "principled discretion" that must be brought to bear when a court
is asked to infer a private cause of action not specified by
authority. ld., at 252 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But the
Court's opinion, read literally, would restrict that discretion
dramatically. Today we are told that a court must entertain a
Bivens suit unless the action is "defeated" in one of two
specified ways.
_
. {~
As bhc Oom ~ liT£"ognize~+-. Biven~ tl"-i JJP~ £(; implied
remedies may be siwi~ when Co~res?\las supplied{fv-t...e..u..5SJ..f'j
"equally effectiveplten1itlve remedies~ !d., at a4~; 1099 y
Bivens v. Six Unl.:nown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388,
97 (197lJJ The Court now volunteers the view that a defendant 'Cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The defendant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective." Ante, at
4 (emphasis in original). These arc unnecessarily rigid conditions. ·The Court cites no authority and advances no ol~-+fA
reason-indeed no reason at all-for imposing ..td:teir threshold \..: 1
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case.
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies
that would be exclusive. Yet, today's opinion apparently will
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed lin guistic
(L .
\
garb. No purpo<>e is Pcrvrcl by affordin g plaintiffs a choice of
remedies in thci:ie circumstan ces. Nor do our prior cases ~ \, f\0 ~MSZ. 1.)(2,.5
--re-quire federal courts to stess f8eit' eyes~to congressional ...(:
.u _ . .u. 1- 1. . .. 1
intent t.h.at HJ:ay not~ expressed in t*e languag~we prescribe. La\-W..r 1 ~· ' 1110.'\ \UY..I(..)Jo..
A defendant l!iili5il alSO\ defeat the Bivens remedy under {~U.L •
today's decision if "speci~ fa:ctors" counsel~te in il!e
"'es 1 1Dv\ •
ahsenCQ of afijrm~~iu8 QQti8ft b3' Cppg!t~!§>. But the Court
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S:P}?pli8B\no further guidance on this point. The
states simply that no such factors are present in this cas~~ \J~Cou..r\-4s
that petitioners enjoy no "independent status in our constitutional scheme" that would make judicially created remedies ('Bit
inappropriate. Ante, at 4. ;the implication that official
status may be a "special factor" is withdrawn in the sentence
that follows, which concludes that qualified immunity affords
all the protection necessary to ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other factors relevant to the
_..._
purported exception are mentioned.
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area
will hereafter be confined to the single determination that >8?
legislliltiv~ :r:9~e8y does or does 1 ot comport with the specifica wns prescribe by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's longstanding recognition that Congress is ultimately the appropriate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5;
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essentially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan
once said, a court should "take into account [a range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express statutor4S
authoriza.tion of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supr!!:.z._3t
~~{- c}..~
407. I do Mt nnder:stanc!Awhy this diScretiOn 'Should be
L ~\ • (\
. t h e manner announce d to day.
(\OT
OJ.
. . dm
_
11m1te
Y9t ~ePe J'HiYJf!ling') the Court's absolute language comes in~~ o..\1 ~ MOrL... , L
a case where the impl~d remedy is plainly appropr!1te under
z:z.\1'/\q ~~IT
any measure of discretion. The Federal Tort Claims Act,
....)
""""''l,_.......__. ~ o~ petitioner~ simply is not an adequate remedy. 1

J

L

_

p

tedv l to \t\o..tMS A'-+'

is not a federal remedial scheme at all, but a waiver of
sovereign immunity that permits an injured claimant to recover damages
against the United States where a private pert>on "would (be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
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indications~at

And there are reasonably clear
Congress did
not intend that statute to displace Bivens claims. See ante,
at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has been identified,
and I am aware of none. I therefore agree that a private
damages remedy properly is inferred from the Constitution
in this case.
ut rdo n t a~ :e-tn:at"Bwens plambffs have
'ng
o t 1is remedy when er the defendant fails to mak
the showing required toda . In my view, the Court's eager
ness to infer federal ca s of action that cannot be found in

1NS6R--I A

II
In Part III of its opinion, the Court holds that" 'whenever
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in
death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.'
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I
agree that the relevant policies require the application o
federal ,common law to allow survival in this case.

'V

sian occurred." 28 U.S. C.§ 1346 (b); see also 28 U.S. C.§ 2674. Here,
as in Bivens itself, a plaintiff~ denied his constitutional remedy would Y
be remitted to tho vagaries of state law. See 403 U. S., at 394-395. The
FTCA gives the plaintiff even less than he would receive under state
law in many cases, because the sta,tute is Fg_ed with vrotections for the ~
United ~ta.tes. As the Court points out, neither jury trial nor punitive
damages~I!II auajlghle under t],i FTQ.A.: Ante at 7. And recovery may __{',
.
~ 1\1\
1
__b_e_barre~ altogether if the claim i~ls'C'refionary function" or l ~~~
"tlie execution of a statute or reguJat,ion, whether or not such statute or
regulation is valid." 28 U. S.C. § 2680 (a).
2 I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer
causes of action from statutes as ~ from the Com;titution. See "?{'
Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 241-242 (1979). I do believe, however,
that the Court today has overstepped the bounds of rational judicial
dccisionmaking in both contexts.

L
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It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national remedial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal common law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not'
,__ _..;c~o..v..:::
:. ered by the "laws of the United States."
-~--- .~
T e Court's opinion in this case(~topf short of mandating l ~
uniform rules to govern all aspects of Bivens actions. Ante
at 9-10, n. 10.
'
-~~uia ; d t.bc lgast io
Cieate 8i :rnesamptmn :ffl favor nf federal .commJ.a.w;.. .NG-

-(IN SerRi a

sHeh ptesampbion-i~ neee~M' -t~sie.R: Q£ this~

M9oFe6\"er, hl-te Oottrt!&ca.ppa.reu,t)~ would re-rerse, in Bi~e1e3 &@oe
tions against fe eral officers, the presumption fav~.s±.ate .•
law in § 1983-..l&wsuits ttg~t state .():ffioors. In Butz v.
-tf.A0 ~.r
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 498-504, and n. 25 (1978), the
'j rco~~il!!l:teei thl!f; it W8HlaJ3e UnSeemly -*'.(different ruJes
Sk.o~ ~ govern the liability of federal and state officers for similar
J coi1stitutional harms. I would not disturb that understanding
today.

\

.J.,

INSERT A, on p. 4:

But I do not agree that Bivens plaintiffs have a
"right" to such a remedy whenever the defendant
fails to show that Congress has "provided an
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it
explicitly declared to be a substitute . . •

In

"

my view, the Court's eagerness to infer federal
causes of action that cannot be found in the

Constitution or in a statute denigrat~ard~eo~poris
doctrine of separation of powers
d4s~ee

and~~·

l.,..

~

to a rational system of justice.

INSERT B, on p. 5

But the Court also says that the preference for
state law embodied in

~

1988 is irrelevant to the

selection of rules that will govern actions against
federal officers under Bivens.
agree.

Ibid.

I do not
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states the
principles governing Bivens actions as follow~:
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional
violation ... have a right to recover damages. . . . Such
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations.
·.The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors
counst:Jtling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
· by Congress.' . . . The second is when defendants
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective. . . ." Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis in original).
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond
the prior holdings of this Court.

I
We are concerned here with inferring a right of action for
damages directly from the Constitution. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 242 (1979), the Court said that persons
who have "no [other] effective means of redress" "must be
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able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." The
Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "principled discretion" that must be brought to bear when a court is asked to
infer a private cause of action not specified by authority.
!d., at 252 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But the Court's opinion,
read literally, would restrict that discretion dramatically.
Today we are told that a court must entertain a Bivens suit
unless the action is "defeated" in one of two specified ways.
, t
Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be unnec_e_s-- --{-. ~rov1·cJ..J..a
sary when Congress hasJSWfltJii'~qj:.'.,..equally effective" alternative remedies. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971); see Davis v. Passman, supra, 442
U. S., at 248. The Court now volunteers the view that a defendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The defendant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective." Ante, at
4 (emphasis in original). These are unnecessarily rigid conditions. The Court cites no authority and advances no policy
reason-indeed no reason at all-for imposing this threshold
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case.
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies
that would be exclusive. Yet, today's opinion apparently will
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic (
garb. No purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice of_. 1s 1tu.~ ()..t--'1
remedies in these circumstances. No!fiQ QWP p1ior ca:~CI!
ft. (.,Lc;(~.:r
Feqnin~- federal courts to blind themselves to congressional ~(1 _ _
. •
intent. expressed in language other than that which we
-rov 1'€..,~
prescnbe.
A defendant also may defeat the Bivens remedy under
today's decision if "special factors" counsel "hesitation." But
the Court provides no further guidance on this point. The

I
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78-1261-CONCUR
CARLSON v. GREEN

r

3

opmwn states simply that no such factors are present in this
case. The Court sa.ys that petitioners enjoy no "independent
status in our constitutional scheme" that would make judicially ereated remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 4. Bu~unph
cation that official status may be a "special factor" is withdra.wn in the sentence that follows, which concludes that
qualified immunity affords all the protection necessary to
ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other
factors relevant to the purported exception are mentioned.
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area
will hereafter be confined to the question of alternative remedies, which is in turn reduced to the single determination that
congressional action does or does not comport with the specifications prescribed by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's longstanding recognition that Congress is ultimately the appropriate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5;
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essentially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan
once said, a court should "take into account [a range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express statutory
authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supra, at
407. The Court does not explain why this discretion should
be limited in the manner announced today.
The Court's absolute language is all the more puzzling
because it comes in a case where the implied remedy is plainly
appropriate under any measure of discretion. The Federal
Tort Claims Act, on which petitioners rely, simply is not an
adequate remedy. 1 And there are reasonably clear indications
The F ederal Tort Claims Act is not a federal remedial scheme at all,
but a waiver of sovereign immunity that permits an injured claimant to
recover damages against the United Stat es where a private person "would
1
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that Congress did not intend that statute to displace Bivens
claims. See ante, at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has
been identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore agree
that a private damages remedy properly is inferred from the
Constitution in this case. But I do not agree that Bivens
plaintiffs have a "right" to such a remedy whenever the
defendant fails to show that Congress has "provided an
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it explicitly
IN ·1\\ 1·1'4 t'Q_$&
declared to be a substitute. . . ." In my view, the Court's
U
eageFJ;J,iil~ to infer federal causes of action that cannot be
found in t e Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a
]~justice. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-749 (1979) (PowELL, J., dissenting). 2

rk

II
In Part III of its opinion, the Court holds that " 'whenever
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in
death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.' "
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S. C.§ 1346 (b) ; sec also 28 U.S. C.
§ 2674. Here, as in Bivens itself, a plaintiff denied his constitutional
remedy would be remitted to the vagaries of slate law. See 403 U. S., at
394-395. The FTCA gives the plaintiff even less than be would receive
under state Jaw in many cases, because the statute is hedged with protections for the United States. As the Court points out, the FTCA allows
neither jury trial nor punitive damages. Ante, at 7. And recovery may
b e barred altogether if the claim arises from a "discretionary function" or
"the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation is valid." 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (a).
2 I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer
causes of act.ion from statutes as from the Constitution. See Davis v.
Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 241-242 (1979). I do believe, however, tha.t the
Court today has overstepped the bounds of rational judicial decisionmaking in both contexts.
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agree that the relevant policies require the application of
federal common law to allow survival in this case.
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national remedial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal common law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not
covered by the "laws of the United States."
The Court's opinion in this case does stop short of mandating uniform rules to govern aJI aspects of Bivens actions.
Ante, at 9-10, n. 10. But the Court also says that the preference for state law embodied in § 1988 is irrelevant to the
selection of rules that will govern actions against federal officers under Bivens. Ibid. I ,\~ R6b agree.. In Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 498-504, and n. 25 (1978), the
Court thought it unseemly that different rules should govern
,___ _.._:t~h:..:::e~l~iability of federal and state officers for similar constitutional~. I would not disturb that understanding today.
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MR. JusTICJ<J PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much
of the language in the Court's opinion. The Court states the
principles governing Bivens actions as follows :
"Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional
violation ... have a right to recover damages. . . . Such
a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations.
The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
by Congress.' . . . The second is when defendants
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective...•" Ante, at 3-4 (emphasis in original) .
The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond
the prior holdings of this Court.

We are concerned here with inferring a right of action for
damages directly from the Constitution. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 242 (1979), the Court said that persons
who have "no [other] effective means of redress" "must be
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able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." The
Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the "principled discretion'' that must be brought to bear when a court is asked to
infer a private cause of action not specified by the enacting
authority. !d., at 252 (POW.bJLL, J .. dissenting). But the
Court's opinion. read literally. would restrict that discretion
dramatically. Today we are told that a court must entertain
a Bivens suit uuless the action is "defeated'' in one of two
specified ways.
Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be unnecessary when Congress has provided "equally cffecti VC' ., alternative remedies. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971); see Davis v. Passman, s·upra, 442
U. S., at 248. The Court uow volunteers the view that a defendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that
there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The defeudant also must show that Congress "explicitly declared
[its remedy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective." Ante, at
4 (emphasis in original). These are unnecessarily rigid conditions. The Court cites no authority and advances no policy
reason- indeed no reason at all-for imposing this threshold
burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case.
The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress
possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies
that would be exclusive. Yet, toclay's opinion apparently will
permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies
if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic
garb. No purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice of
remedies in these circumstances. Nor is there any precedent
for requiring federal courts to blind themselves to congressional intent expressed in language other than that which we
prescribe.
A defendant also may defeat the Bivens remedy under
loclay's decision if "special factors" counsel "hesitation." But.
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the Court provides no further guidance on this point. The
opinion states simply that no such factors are present in this
case. The Court says that petitioners enjoy no "independent
status in our constitutional scheme" that would make judicially created remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 4. But the
implication that official status may be a "special factor" is withdrawn in the sentence that follows, which concludes that
qualified ir~1munity affords all the protection necessary to
ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other
factors relevant to the purported exception are mentioned.
One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area
will hereafter be confined to the question of alternative remedies, which is in turn reduced to the single determination that
congressional action does or does not comport with the specifications prescribed by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment
of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court's longstauding recognition that Congress is ultimately the appropriate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 4-5;
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, 403
U. S., at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under
the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essentially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan
once said, a court should "take into account la range of policy
considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express statutory
authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, supra, at
407. The Court does not explain why this discretion should
be limited in the manner announced today.
The Court's absolute language is all the more puzzling
because it comes in a case where the implied remedy is plainly
appropriate under any measure of discretion. The Federal
Tort Claims Act, on which petitioners rely, simply is not an
adequate remedy. 1 And there are reasonably clear indications
The Federal Tort Claim~ Ac1 is not a frdcral remedial scheme at all,
Lqt a wajver of sovereign immunity that prrmits an injurrd claimant to
1
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that Congress did not intend that statute to displace Bivens
claims. See ante, at 4-5. No substantial contrary policy has
been identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore agree
that a private damages remedy properly is inferred from the
Constitution in this case. But I do not agree that Bivens
plaintiffs have a "right" to such a remedy whenever the
defendant fails to show that Congress has "provided an
[equally effective] alternative remedy which it explicitly
declared to be a substitute . ..." In my view, the Court's
willingness to infer federal causes of actiou that cannot be
found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a
rational system of justice. Cf. Cannon Y. University of Chieago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-749 (1979) (Pow.J<.:LL, J., dissenting). 2

II
In Part III of its opinion, the Court holds that '' 'whenever
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type
action brought against defendants whose conduct results in
death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.' "
Ante, at 9, quoting 581 F. 2d 699, 674-675 (CA7 1978). I
recover damages against the United States where a private per~on "would
be liabiP to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omi::;sion occurred." 28 U.S. C.§ 1346 (b); sre abo 28 U.S. C.
§ 2674. Here, ns in Bivens itself, a plaintiff denied his eonl'titutional
remedy would be rPmitted to the vagaries of ~tate law. See 403 U. S., Ht
394-395. The FTCA givrs the plaiutiff evt•n le:s~ than he would receive
tmdrr stall' law in many ca~~,.,, becau~e thP ,.;tntutc is hedged with proLectiom for the United Statrs. A~ the Court points out, the FTCA allows
nrither jury trial nor punitive damage::;. Ante, at 7. And l'l'covery may
UP barred altogether if the claim arises from a "discretionary function " or
"tlw execution of a statute or regulat.ion, whether or not such stt~tutc or
regulation is valid." 28 U.S. C.§ 2680 (a).
~I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to infer
can:-;c::; of act.ion from stMutes as from t.he Constitution. Sec Davis v.
PaBi:irnan, 442 U.S. 228 , 241-242 (19i9) . I do believe, however, that. Lhe
Court today ha:; over"1:cpped the bounds of ra tiona! judicial deeisionmaking in both context.s.
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agree that the relevant policies require the application of
federal common law to allow survival in this case.
It is not "obvious" to me, however, that "the liability of
federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights
should be governed by uniform rules" in every case. Ante, at
8; see id., at 9. On the contrary, federal courts routinely
refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national remedial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal common law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal
claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state
law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not
covered by the "laws of the United States."
The Court's opinion in this case does stop short of mandating uniform rules to govern all aspects of Bivens actions.
Ante, at 9-10, n. 10. But the Court also says that the preference for state law embodied in § 1988 is irrelevant to the
selection of rules that will govern actions against federal offieers under Bivens. Ibid. I see no basis for this view. In
Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478. 498-504. and n. 25 (1978),
the Court thought it. unseemly that different rules should
govern the liability of federal and state officers for similar
constitutional wrongs. I would not disturb that under·standing today,

